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Abstract
It is not possible to model semantics of natural language unless one can clearly establish the structure
of contextual information and how "context" guides the construction of semantic identities of linguistic
units. We claim that this cannot be done unless one can overcome the representational locality imposed
by extensional formalisms. In this paper we present a formalism aiming at setting up a non-extensional
framework allowing the expression of a notion of context. The very notion of identity is revisited and
some forms of non-extensional identity are proposed. In the last section we suggest a representation of
metaphor understanding that implements a form of interaction between global contextual information and
local semantic identities.
1 Introduction
One of the most important problems in modeling semantics of Natural Language is undoubtfully the representational
locality of the chosen formal features. Formal locality is apparently contradictory to empirical facts; the semantic
identity of a linguistic unit—at whatever level it might be—is determined only within global structures. In formal
constructions one generally recovers such global structures by more elementary ones, given by locally necessary and
sufficient definitional means. Nevertheless, in Natural Language the primacy is rather to the global structures as
they are necessary for the definition of the semantic character of the more elementary ones.
In interpretational semantics [Rastier, 1987] this last constitutes the major principle. The problem in such an
approach is the construction of interpretation strategies. From a structuralistic point of view this turns out to be
equivalent to the determination of a specific recurrence of semantic components giving isotopies. An isotopy is a form
of logically coherent actualization of a possible co-occurrence of such components. Many different strategies may be
operational and thus many interpretational schemata may be possible, corresponding to different senses of the same
text. What precisely changes across such strategies is the semantic identity of the relevant linguistic entities insofar
as different semic actualizations are selected.
Interpretational semantics as a general semantic theory is not yet formalized. The long-term aim of this paper is
to provide a plausible approach towards a general formal model. Here we give a glimpse of the formalism by showing
how to define a notion of semantic identity and a notion of context so that we shall be able to express semantic
identity shifts as effects of interpretational strategies.
2 Formalism
The basic representational unit is called a "concept" . Let C be the set of all concepts and define To such that:
To =df U Ci ; where every Ci is given by
Ci =df n;= , Ci and Ci =df C for every 1< 5_ i
	
(1)
The entities in To, of the form E(n)i =df (ca ,c12	 ,cin), are called "vector-concepts" . To is supposed to be
extensional.
Let us also define the level T1 ("theories" of level 1 in the sense of [Murphy and Medin, 1985]) that gives To its
structure.
T1 =df It t is a relation over C i (1 < i < n)}	 (2)
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The notion of extension of a theory provides the basic link between levels To and T1:
ext(t( n)i ) =df	 I E To and satisfies t(n)i}
	
(3)
Furthermore, we can introduce an indiscerniblitiy relation =ext
t(n)i
	 t(n)j if ext(t (n)i ) = ext(t(n)i)
	 (4)
T1 is non-extensional, and we suppose that if E C To such that Vx,y E E, x and y are vector-concepts of the same
arity, then there is a natural n > 1 et t 1 ,	 E T1 such that Vi = 1,	 ,n ext(ti ) = E.
Thus we have a relation between theories based on theories' extensions. On the other hand, the structure of the
vector-concepts in the extension of a theory allows to consider it from a more "microscopic" point of view. This is
done by the notion of projection of a theory.
Consider t (n)i , an nary theory in T1 , we define its j-projection, 1 < j < n as a unary theory in T1 , noted
such that:
where c is such that
ext (iij) =df	 there is ac E ext (t(o)
	
(5)
whose j-component is c
Clearly theories can be related through their j-projections via a relation based on extensional equality:
t(n)i
	 t(n)k iff EiJ ext	 ikj
Furthermore, we can extend this definition in order to build k-ary projections of a theory. There are several ways to
build such projections. We shall discuss here only the non-adjacent k-ary projection of a theory t ( n)i , noted P(k)i{w},
which is relevant for our aims; it is a matter of a k-ary theory j(k)i{w} such that:
3 "e E ext (t(n)i ) where
cg, is its ?L1-component
ext (E(k)i{1})=df	 1,cg2,...,Cgk,)
	 c92 is its 712-component
cgk is its 71k-component
where 71 is an injection from {1, 	 , k} to {1,	 , n}.
Clearly there is an indiscernibility relation between theories through their k-ary projections: the ordered non-
adjacent k-ary projective equality (noted =p(k)....{7}):
t(n)i =p(k)–{1.0 t(n)p iff	 =ext i(k)p{7-11	 (8)
However, one should notice that there may be several ways for two theories to be projectively indiscernible. On
the other hand, one may even remove the constraint on the arity of theories being compared so that one can obtain
a general projective equality between theories of different arity. For instance, one may define a general projective
equality, noted =p—gen, based on the partial order <p–gen, which is given as follows: for t(n)i, t(m)j E T1 , and
m n naturals:
t(n)i 5P–gen, t(m)j iff do 5-ext ijk	 (9)
These two indiscernibility relations are easily generalizable to k-ary projections. All the technical consequences
and related notions are treated in [Zaldivar-Carrillo, 1995]. A special attention is given to the qualification of the
notion of identity, as far as difference and identity are ubiquitous in every structuralistic analysis. The aim is to
model the notion of identity which takes a large variety of local forms by virtue of the notion of projection. Moreover,
logical relations are introduced and relativized to every local identity form.
Let now T2 be a third level of theories defined as follows:
T2 =df 
{t expresses a n-ary relation over T1
t I or a binary relation over T1 U To
of the form (6„ti)
The motivation of T2 is to "internalize" some notions such as the relation which expresses that concept Ci belongs
to the extension of theory t l( „)3 ; such a theory is called a complex theory of level 2. All notions, and specifically those
concerning the indiscernibility relations, introduced for theories of level 1, are generalizable at this level. We shall
(6)
}
	
(7)
}
	
(10)
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not present them here. Nevertheless, one has to notice that all the notions based on the extension of a theory have
to be reconsidered since level T1 is non-extensional. Thus, two extensionally equal theories may not belong to the
same extension of a theory of level 2. This remark allows us to introduce some further notions. First, the notion of
saturation of a theory t2(n)i (noted s(t2(n)i)); it corresponds to a theory t2(n)j (of level 2) such that for every theory
in the extension of t2(n)i the whole class of = ext-equivalence of that theory belongs also to the extension of t2(n)i.
t2(n)i <ext t2(n)j• Secondly, a new indiscernibility relation between theories of level 2 may be defined, theClearly, 
virtual equality between two theories, noted =virt:
t2(n)i =virt t2(n)j iff S(t2(n)i) =ext S(t2(n)j)
Intuitively speaking, the virtual identity expresses the possibility to envisage two different theories as locally
different selections of the same relational information (a saturated theory).
The rudiments of a non-extensional framework necessary to define the notion of semantic identity are now
prompted. In order to formalize the very notion of semantic identity one has first to introduce the notion of the
global intension of a concept (noted int9(c)):
int, (ci ) =df {t(ok 3Iik 1 < j < m, such thatrr
	
ci E ext (iik)	 (12)
Thus, the global intension of a theory contains all the theories (of level 1 or 2) which, somehow, describe the
concept, by expressing either one of the properties of the concept (as a unary theory) or a relation satisfied by
the concept (a n-ary theory). Obviously, the global intension is still too broad to be operational. Indeed, in any
"context" only a small part of the knowledge is necessary. This is captured by the notion of a semantic identity of a
concept:
	
SIk (ci) g int, (ci )	 (13)
Clearly, a concept possesses many semantic identities. On the other hand, we can introduce some intensional
relations between concepts based on their semantic identity. For instance, we can define the local synonymy of two
concepts (noted sloe:	
c1 aloc C2 if S/k (ci ) = Sim (c2 )	 (14)
Thus if two concepts have the same semantic identity in a given "context", we can consider them as locally indis-
cernible. One may at this level better understand our preoccupation about forms of non-extensional indiscernibility.
Furthermore, one may define the virtual synonymy between two concepts which expresses the possibility to find a
particular "context" in which the two concepts may be considered locally as semantically indiscernible:
Cl avirt c2 iff SIk(C1) n Sim(c2) 0	 (15)
Let us now introduce a formal notion of context. As we have said, context may be considered as some global
structure which constraints and guides the construction of more local representational structures. Thus we may
define a context Ki as a set of theories of level 2:
	
=df It2 I t2 E T21; Ki g T2	 (16)
Of course, we suppose that K i does not contain logically contradictory theories.
Since context is represented as a structure of theories of level 2, we may formalize the notion of contextual signifi-
cance for theories of level 1 and concepts. Let Ki be a context; the set of theories of level 1 significant for the context
Ki (noted T1i ) is defined as follows:
3t2 E Ki and 3i2pi such that
t i E eXt(tpj)
Consequently one may define the set of significant concepts in a context K i (noted Cn as follows:
C: =df {c I Vti E S/i(c), t 1 E T1i}
Finally, let us introduce a function (I , that "puts the concept c1 into a context" by returning, for a given context, all
the pertinent concepts which have, somehow, a local semantic relation with cl . More formally, let c 1 be a pertinent
concept in Ki , then:
(ci,Ki) =df IC I	 3
3	 SIi (ci )n SIi(c)	 (19)
c is pertinent in Iii and
(I) has an actual effect and expresses "top-down" constraints.
We have set up a non-extensional formal framework able to express a notion of context and a related notion of
pertinence for theories of level 1 and concepts. Let us evaluate its descriptivity in a NL understanding example.
t 1 I	 3Tli =df
	
(17)
(18)
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3 Example
Consider the metaphorical schema "argument is war" from [Lakoff and Johnson, 1980]. The way metaphors such
as this one organize our everyday language is illustrated by the fact that the following expressions are commonly
accepted: "Your claims are indefensible", "He attacked every weak point in my argument", "His criticism were right
on target", "I demolished his argument", "I've never won an argument with him", "You disagree? Okay, shoot!", "He
shot down all my arguments", to cite but a few. As Lakoff and Johnson notice, it is important to see that we do
not only talk about arguments in terms of war, but we actually experience arguments like a real war with enemies,
allies, battles, positions, strategies, etc.
In our conception, this means that there exist a concept "argument" which is somehow related with another
concepts such as "opinion", "idea", "critique", "agreement", and there exist another concept "war" that is related
to some other concepts like "battle", "weapon", "strategy", "victory", "defeat", "position", "attack", "destruction",
"violence", "conquer". Understanding the metaphor "argument is war", means that one enhances the set of relations
that describes "argument" with some relations taken from those describing "war"; thus one can see one's ideas as
positions which may be defensible and someone's criticisms as attacks against these positions, and so on.
Thus, function (I), when applied to concept "argument" will return the set formed by concepts "opinion", "idea",
"critique", "agreement"; this set is called the semantic field of concept "argument" and it is symbolized by Dargument •
The metaphoric mechanism can be formalized as a function that enhances the semantic identity and the semantic
champ of the target concept with theories and concepts which belongs to the semantic identity and the semantic
champ of the source concept. Such a function 2 may be defined as follows:
---r-df (fclfasi)
	 (20)
where each ft is a function of the form:
fc : (C1, C2)
d : Dc 1 x D.2 -4 D',	 (21)
fsi : SI(ci ) x SI(c2 )	 15(ci)
such that:
S (CO =df S I(C1) U S 1." (C1)
	 (22)
where S In (ci ) is defined as follows:
SI" (C1) =d t(n)i I
auji such that
ext(iii ) = {c1 } and
3 t (m)k E SI(c2),
n > m, and
t( Toi =P(m--1)-{71} t(m)k
}
(23)
In the simpler case j = 1 and 1t becomes the identity function. On the other hand Dc, is the new semantic field
after the application of function 4 for the new semantic identity of c l . One can show that:
• Dc 1 is conserved modulo =czt but this is not necessarily the case for the other forms of identity.
• It is possible that c2 E	 but this is not generally the case.
• The semantic identities may be structured from more general to more specific ones and this may induce an order
in the metaphoric mechanisms.
• Dci depends on the projective qualities of theories in S I (c2 ) and not in their extension, arity or number.
4 Concluding Remarks
Until now, the overall theory of interpretational semantics was rather set up on elementary set-theoretical foundations.
But one requires non-extensional constructions insofar as extensionality is quite restrictive for semantic phenomena.
Moreover, the kernel of the theory is based on two fundamental notions: that of relation between semantic components
and that of semantic identity. The latter is drastically different from the usual extensional one as tightly dependent
on contextual modifications; on the other hand, in an interpretational strategy, it takes a more "collective" form.
The formal framework presented in this paper is the first step towards a formalism able to capture some of the
contextual features required to implement a system in this sense of doing some semantic interpretation of natural
language. Future work will consist in building a system for computer-aided interpretation of literary texts.
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